In a two-country model, I analyze international environmental agreements when a country's emission abatement costs are private information and participation to an agreement is voluntary. I show that the presence of asymmetric information may prevent countries from reaching a first-best agreement if this information asymmetry is too high. I propose a new channel to restore the feasibility of the first-best agreement: pre-play communication. By revealing its abatement cost through a certification agency in a pre-play communication stage, a country commits not to misreport this abatement cost during the negotiations of an agreement. Hence, following certification by at least one country, information asymmetry is reduced. Certification restores the feasibility of the first-best agreement except for intermediate levels of information asymmetry. For those levels, one country undergoing certification is not always sufficient to restore the feasibility of the first-best but it is impossible to find transfers between countries such that they both optimally accept to undergo certification. One country has always an incentive to free-ride on the other country's certification.
Introduction
The classical explanation for the failure of international negotiations on environmental issues is the free-rider problem: countries have the possibility to opt out of the negotiations while still enjoying the benefits of the global agreement. It is well-known from the mechanism design literature that inefficiencies arising from the free-rider problem are particularly relevant in contexts plagued by information asymmetry.
For example, Rob (1989) , and Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) stress the role of participation constraints to generate inefficiency. However, international environmental agreements are generally preceded by discussion rounds during which concerned parties do not negotiate pollution abatement targets but can communicate with each other and exchange information. This paper takes a mechanism design approach and studies the effect of asymmetric information about pollution abatement costs on the feasibility of an efficient environmental agreement when participation to this agreement is voluntary and when countries can communicate before negotiations start.
In the case of international environmental agreements, information asymmetry can also be a problem for negotiating this type of agreement. Information asymmetry can be understood as a lack of real knowledge about abatement options and costs available in other countries. For example, Espinola-Arredondo and Munoz-Garcia (2012) suggest that, in the context of climate change, the penetration rate of clean technologies along all industries in a specific country, and so the abatement cost of this country, is difficult to observe by outsiders. Information asymmetry can also be interpreted in a broader sense as the political cost necessary to implement a certain level of emission abatement (i.e. countries may have private information about the relative weight of environmental problems in governments' agenda).
1 Whatever the source of information asymmetry, this will be an issue for the negotiations of abatement targets. Countries have an incentive to exaggerate their privately known pollution abatement cost (or understate their privately known abatement benefit) in order to reduce the effort they have to supply and leave most of the burden of abatement on other countries.
Another characteristic of international environmental agreement is the fact that international cooperation develops overtime (see Wagner, 2001 ). This development usually follows a particular pattern: countries first agree on an initial agree-1 See for example Konrad and Thum (2014) . ment, i.e. an umbrella convention, that generally does not contain any countries' emission reduction targets but sets up the institutions entitled to gather information transmitted by countries and to negotiate all subsequent emission reduction targets.
In a second stage, countries negotiate an agreement with emission reduction targets and financial or technology transfers.
In Convention established the UNEP as a secretariat and asked this body to convene workshops to develop a more common understanding of factors affecting the ozone layer including costs and effects of possible control measures (see Benedick, 1998) .
As shown by these examples, in many cases, there exists an international agency that collects information transmitted by countries. If the umbrella Convention setting up this agency is designed in such a way that it is allowed to verify countries' information (for example, by sending experts), this agency can to some extent be used as a certification device. The contribution of this paper is twofold.
First, I show how the presence of information asymmetry about abatement costs may exacerbate the free-rider problem. 2 The second contribution of this paper is the introduction of a communication stage during which countries have the possibility to exchange verifiable information trough an international agency. In doing so, I also propose a new channel to restore the feasibility of an efficient agreement:
pre-play communication with certification.
My analysis is carried out within the framework of the private provision of a public good under asymmetric information. The public good considered here is the reduction of some pollutant. To provide this public good, countries incur emission abatement costs. Each country knows its own abatement cost, but not that of the other country. An environmental agreement consists of binding commitments to some emission abatement levels and monetary transfers between countries. The efficient or first-best agreement is the one that maximizes global welfare. Participation to this first-best agreement is voluntary. This agreement is feasible if all countries are willing to participate to it and if they all reveal their abatement cost truthfully.
The objective of the model is to analyze the conditions on the economic environment (preferences, distribution of abatement costs) for which the first-best agreement is feasible.
I first consider a model without pre-play communication. Due to a trade-off between ensuring participation to the agreement and ensuring truth-telling, a firstbest agreement is not feasible when the range of the distribution of abatement costs is too large (in other words, when the information asymmetry is high).
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Then, I introduce a pre-play communication stage, i.e. an umbrella convention that establishes an international agency entitled to gather information about privately known abatement costs provided by participating countries. In this model, I
assume that this information is totally verifiable: the international agency can monitor and certify the countries' privately known information if sovereign countries give their consent.
The effects of certification are twofold. On the one hand, the information asymmetry between countries is reduced. On the other hand, the country certifying its abatement cost loses the possibility to misreport this abatement cost, and thereby may see its monetary transfer in the first-best agreement reduced.
Compared to a model without the possibility of certification, I show that there exist three types of equilibrium in the two-stage game. First, for low levels of information asymmetry, there is always one country using the certification agency as 3 Similar inefficiencies were pointed out in related setups. In the context of public good economies, Laffont and Maskin (1979) have shown that no truthful and efficient mechanisms may exist if individual rationality constraints are taken into account. In the private goods case, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) showed the impossibility of attaining ex-post efficiency with an incentive-compatible and individually rational mechanism.
a commitment device to truthfully disclose its abatement cost. The induced reduction of information asymmetry allows countries to reach the first-best agreement for all realizations of abatement costs. Second, for intermediate levels of information asymmetry, there is still one country using the certification agency, but the firstbest is not implementable for all realizations of abatement costs. Finally, when the information asymmetry is very high, it is possible to find transfer schemes such that both countries decide to reveal their type through the certification agency before negotiations. In this case, the first-best is achieved for all realizations of abatement costs. Due to this high information asymmetry, the probability that only one certification is sufficient to reach the first-best is very low, so countries do not have an incentive to free-ride on each others' certification. Therefore, even if countries have the possibility to get rid of information asymmetry and implement the first-best agreement, there still exist economic environments for which a first-best agreement is not feasible. This is due to the fact that it is impossible to design transfers that avoid free-riding by one country in the use of certification.
Some papers have developed specific applications of the mechanism design theory to environmental economics (e.g. Rob, 1989 player will reveal all of his information in equilibrium, even though this lowers his ex-ante payoff. In this paper, I focus on the private provision of a public good.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the main assumptions of the two-country model. Section 3 shows the effect of asymmetric information on the feasibility of the first-best agreement. In section 4, I introduce pre-play communication. I conclude in section 5.
2 The model
The setting
There are two countries, i = 1, 2, that exert some non-negative pollution abatement efforts a i . Global abatement benefit is simply the total quantity of abatement, i.e.
(a 1 + a 2 ). Each country i receives a share of this global benefit:
, where
Countries are heterogeneous in terms of their marginal cost of abatement. By exerting abatement effort a i , country i incurs a cost of
. For tractability, I adopt a quadratic form where θ i can be interpreted as the characteristic of the technology of country i. 6 Finally, country i may receive a transfer t i for undertaking the requested abatement. Country i's utility function is given by:
The parameter θ i is privately observed by country i. The types θ i are independently drawn from the same uniform distribution defined on the support [θ,θ], with 0 < θ <θ. The cumulative and probability distribution function are respectively given by
The country with the highest θ i is the most efficient at undertaking abatement efforts. I denote the set of states of the world as:
For future reference, I define an economic environment as follows:
Definition 1 An economic environment Ω consists of: 4 Note that in public good games, some papers have analyzed the role of pre-play cheap talk.
See for example, Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991) • A range for the distribution of types ∆θ = (θ − θ);
• Individual marginal benefits from abatements (b 1 , b 2 ).
In this setting, the first-best abatement levels are denoted by (a
2 ) and are defined as:
Definition 2 The first-best abatement levels (a
2 ) = (θ 1 , θ 2 ) are the abatement levels that maximize the global welfare:
The most efficient countries in terms of abatement are those that abate the most at the first-best. In this paper, I will investigate whether these abatement levels can be implemented under asymmetric information about abatement costs and voluntary participation to an agreement.
Mechanisms
A mechanism is an agreement concluded between both countries and it consists of abatement levels a i and transfers t i for each country. 7 By the revelation principle, there is no loss of generality in restricting our attention to direct and truthful revelation mechanisms (Myerson, 1982) . A direct revelation mechanism, y = (a 1 , a 2 , t 1 , t 2 ), is composed of a level of abatement for each country a i : Θ × Θ → R that describes the abatement effort of each country as a function of countries' reported types, and a transfer t i : Θ × Θ → R that describes each country's received transfer from undertaking the requested abatement effort as a function of countries' reported types.
I denote the utility of country i of type θ i from the direct revelation mechanism y(θ 1 ,θ 2 ), whereθ i are the reported types for each country i, by:
Since in this paper, I am interested in the implementation of the first-best abatement levels (a
2 ), I define the first-best agreement as follows:
7 Including transfers in environmental agreements is often explicit. Article 11 of the Kyoto Protocol allows for the possibility of monetary transfers from developed to developing countries through the Global Environment Facility.
2 ) is the first-best agreement where a
The expected utility of country i under this first-best agreement is given by:
where E θ j [.] denotes the expectation over the possible types of country j.
To be implementable, a mechanism must satisfy three constraints. First, as countries are privately informed, the mechanism must be incentive compatible. Second, the mechanism must ensure that both countries want to join the agreement (i.e. individual rationality). Finally, there is also a budget balance constraint. These constraints are detailed below.
Bayesian incentive compatibility. Bayesian incentive compatibility of the mechanism y(., .), implies that the expected utility of country i must satisfy:
In other words, truth-telling gives country i the highest possible expected utility, provided the other country j does. By pretending to be a little bit less efficient in terms of abatement, i.e pretending to be of a type θ i − , a country of type θ i can abate at the same level as the less efficient type θ i − but at a lower marginal cost.
The difference in terms of marginal cost is:
To ensure truth-telling, the mechanism must reward therefore the most efficient types by an extra amount,
that is equal to this difference in terms of marginal cost. By letting tend to zero, we get the result of lemma 1:
The direct revelation mechanism y(., .) satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility if and only if E θ j [a 2 i (θ i , θ j )] is weakly increasing in θ i and
WhereV i (.) is the derivative of the utility function with respect to the announcement of country i.
It immediately follows that an incentive compatible mechanism must give a greater payoff to the most efficient countries. As, in the sequel, I focus on incentive compatible direct revelation mechanism, I will simplify the notation of the expected utility:
This is the expected utility of country i from the direct and truthful revelation mechanism y(θ i , θ j ) when this country i is of type
Budget balance. I assume that no external source of funds is available and that there is no waste of resource. 8 Hence, the ex-ante budget-balance constraint implies that:
where E θ 1 θ 2 denotes the expectation over the types of countries 1 and 2. The interpretation of this constraint is that the overall surplus generated by countries' abatement efforts should be equal to their overall payoff. Note that there is no loss of generality in using the ex-ante budget balance constraint instead of the more nat-
Börgers and Norman (2009), if types are independent, for every ex-ante budgetbalanced mechanism, there exists an ex-post budget-balanced mechanism such that the allocation rule is unchanged and the interim expected payments are unchanged for all agents.
Individual rationality. Finally, participation to an environmental agreement y is voluntary. The outside option is the non-cooperative equilibrium. It consists for country i in choosing its abatement level to maximize its own utility. Since countries choose their abatement non-cooperatively, there is no transfer, i.e. t 1 = t 2 = 0.
is the non-cooperative equilibrium if and only if Countries do not internalize the benefit of their abatement level on the other country and there is an under-provision of emission abatements. Note that a N i is a dominant strategy (i.e. the abatement chosen is the same whatever the behavior of the other country).The expected utility of country i under the outside option is denoted:
Since countries know their type when deciding to join a treaty, the interim individual rationality constraint requires that:
3 A model without pre-play communication
Complete information benchmark
As a benchmark, I will first assume that countries' types θ i for i = 1, 2, are public knowledge, so that abatement and transfer levels do not have to be incentive compatible. However, the first-best mechanism must still satisfy budget balance and individual rationality.
Proposition 1
In all economic environments Ω, the first-best agreement y
Proof Using equations (2) and (7), the transfers necessary to make each country willing to participate to the first-best agreement are given by:
Using the budget-balance constraint t 1 (θ 1 , θ 2 ) + t 2 (θ 1 , θ 2 ) = 0, the condition for the implementation of a first-best agreement under complete information is the following:
In equation (10), θ 1
for all θ i > 0. Indeed, rearranging this inequality, we get:
2 The result follows since the term on the left hand side is always negative, while the term on the right hand side is always positive.
Two-sided asymmetric information
Now, I assume that the countries' types θ i are private information. Combining interim individual rationality (7), bayesian incentive compatibility (4) and budget balance (5) yields the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Given an economic environment Ω, the first-best agreement y F B is implementable ∀θ i ∈ [θ,θ] (i = 1, 2) if and only if this economic environment satisfies:
Proof See appendix A.
The left hand side of condition (11) is the relative range of the distribution of types ∆θ/θ. By lemma 1, we know that to ensure truth-telling the most efficient countries must be given the highest payoffs. If information asymmetry, measured by the range ∆θ, is high, the incentives of the most efficient types for misreporting are big. Avoiding such free-riding requires large compensations, i.e. large information rent, for those very efficient countries.
The right hand side of condition (11) 
With the ex-ante budget balance constraint (5), these efficiency gains must be fully redistributed among countries. Using equations (2) and (6) yields:
When countries are symmetric, the non-cooperative equilibrium welfare is closer to the first-best welfare. the efficiency gains that can be redistributed among countries to ensure participation and truth-telling are lower. These expected gains are the lowest for symmetric countries.
In other words, condition (11) states that efficiency gains must be higher than information costs (measured by the level of information asymmetry). To understand this result, we need to figure out the impact of the economic environment Ω on individual rationality and incentive compatibility.
As the budget balance constraint must always be satisfied, the compensations granted to the most efficient types are limited by the necessity to ensure participation of all types, including the least efficient ones. When the range of the distribution of types is very large or when efficiency gains are low, one cannot find incentive compatible transfers that implement the first-best abatement levels and that give all types (including the least efficient ones) strictly more than their expected noncooperative payoffs. For economic environments that does not satisfy condition (11), we can say that there is a tension between incentive compatibility, budget-balance and individual rationality that prevents countries from reaching the first-best agreement. Compared to the benchmark case, the presence of asymmetric information reduces the set of economic environments for which countries can implement the first-best agreement.
Transfers under the first-best agreement. When the economic environment satisfies condition (11), the first-best abatement levels a F B i (θ 1 , θ 2 ) = θ i can be implemented using transfers that satisfy Bayesian incentive compatibility, individual rationality and budget balance. We have shown that if a mechanism is bayesian incentive compatible, the expected utility of each country i must satisfy equation (4) . Integrating this equation yields:
where
. Using equation (1) and rearranging terms, we can recover the transfers under the first-best agreement:
is the expected abatement level and t i (θ i ) is the expected level of transfer. 9 This can also be rewritten as:
This expected first-best transfer is increasing in country i's type. The higher the type θ i , the higher the term (a
. the more the country should abate in the first-best agreement. It is then necessary to give efficient countries a higher transfer to give them an incentive to reveal truthfully their type. This transfer negatively depends on b i : the higher the marginal benefit from abatement, the higher the contribution of the country to the mechanism. This makes sense: if a country cares a lot about the environment, it will be ready to contribute more in order to implement the first-best agreement.
This transfer also depends on t F B i (θ), which is the first-best transfer for the least efficient type. This transfer must satisfy the individual rationality and I show in appendix A, that if it is the case, then individual rationality is also satisfied for more efficient types.
One-sided asymmetric information
Finally, as it will be useful in the next section, I also derive the condition under which the first-best agreement is implemented when only one country has private information. Considering that the resolution of this problem is very similar to the previous case, I just report the main results. Details can be found in Appendix B.
Assume that country i's type is public knowledge and country j's type is privately known. I first derive the following Lemma, which states that, given the economic environment, the first-best agreement can be implemented if country i is sufficiently efficient in terms of abatement.
Lemma 2 When country i's type is public knowledge and country j's type is privately known, the first-best agreement y F B is implementable ∀θ j ∈ [θ,θ] if and only
Proof See Appendix B.
As before, the intuition behind this result relies on the efficiency gains:
These gains are increasing in the publicly known type θ i . The more efficient in terms of abatement country i is, the larger the efficiency gains available to solve the tension between participation and truth-telling are.
The critical typeθ i is the threshold from which the first-best agreement can be implemented when country i's type is public knowledge. It is increasing in the relative range of the distribution ∆θ θ
: the tension between incentive compatibility, budget-balance and individual rationality is stronger for larger ranges of the distribution. A higher value of θ i is then necessary to solve the tension.
Ifθ i ≤ θ, the first-best agreement y F B will be implementable for all possible publicly known types θ i ∈ [θ,θ]. This will be the case if the economic environment satisfies the following condition:
It is then possible to derive a proposition similar to Proposition 2 (see Appendix B): 
4 A model with pre-play communication 
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In stage 2, countries at least privately know their types and they negotiate an environmental agreement using the direct revelation mechanism that implements the first-best agreement if it is feasible and they resort to the non-cooperative outcome otherwise. This is the abatement stage. Note that the non-cooperative outcome y 
Stage 2: abatement game
The equilibrium outcome in stage 2 depends on the actions taken in stage 1. If both countries have accepted transmitting their private information to the certification agency in stage 1, the equilibrium outcome in stage 2 is the first-best agreement y F B (because there is complete information). If no country has accepted, then the equilibrium outcome in stage 2 is the non-cooperative equilibrium y N .
10 It would be more realistic to assume that countries decide whether or not to undertake certification at an interim stage (i.e. when each country knows its own abatement cost), but the resolution of the two-stage game would become intractable. This resolution would require looking at beliefs conditional on observable moves and non-equilibrium beliefs.
If only country i has allowed the international agency to certify its type θ i , the equilibrium outcome in stage 2 depends on the economic environment and on the value of country i's type (see Lemma 2 and Proposition 3). 
Best responses of country i
If s j = N C, i.e. if country j refuses certification by the international agency, the best response of country i is to allow for it for all economic environments satisfying ∆θ θ > L 0 . Indeed, by certifying its type, country i increases the probability that the first-best agreement is implemented in stage 2: this probability increases from zero to (1 − F (θ i )), where F (.) is the cumulative density function of the type θ i . Since the first-best (which satisfies the individual rationality constraint) gives a higher expected utility than the non-cooperative equilibrium, country i will always prefer to reveal its type through the certification agency. An immediate consequence of this best response is that there will always be at least one country that allows certification of its type at the equilibrium of stage 1.
If s j = C, if country j allows the international agency to certify its type, the best response of country i is more difficult to determine. Intuitively, the incentive for certification will depend on the economic environment Ω (which determines the gains from reaching an agreement and the probability that country j is sufficiently efficient in terms of abatement) and on the comparison between the transfers received in the first-best in the two sub-games (i.e. when both countries allow for certification and when only country j allows for certification).
Consider y(θ 1 , θ 2 ) = (a
2 , t 1 , t 2 ), the mechanism chosen to implement the first-best abatement levels under complete information and y (θ 1 , θ 2 ) = (a • If country i allows for certification in stage 1 (s i = C), there is complete information in stage 2 and the first-best is always implementable using a mechanism y(θ 1 , θ 2 ). The expected utility of country i in stage 1 is then given by (see equation (2)):
which is equivalent to:
The first term of the right hand side of (13) is the expected utility under the non-cooperative equilibrium (see equation (6)). The second term is the extra gain from reaching the first-best agreement. Because individual rationality constraint is satisfied, this extra gain is always positive.
• If country i does not allow for certification in stage 1 (s i = N C), the first-best is implementable using a mechanism y (θ 1 , θ 2 ) if and only if θ j ≥θ j . Denote
(1 − F (θ j )) the probability that θ j ≥θ j , where F (.) is the cumulative density function of the type θ j . The expected utility of country i is given by:
Rearranging terms yields:
The first term on the right hand side of (14) is the same as in (13) (the expected utility under the non-cooperative equilibrium) and the second term is the expected extra gain from reaching the first-best agreement, which is implementable only if country j is sufficiently efficient.
Comparing expressions (13) and (14) confirms our intuition that the best response of country i when s j = C depends on (1) the transfers used to implement the first-best abatement levels in stage 2 (either with certification of both countries
the relative intensity of preferences over abatement (i.e. values of b i and b j ), and (3) the probability that country j is sufficiently efficient (1 − F (θ j )). The two last factors are determined by the economic environment Ω.
There are potentially many transfers
that implement the first-best agreement in each case. In order to find the best response of country i when country j allows for certification, I have the following assumption Assumption 1 Country i will accept the certification of its type if and only if this country can be sure to obtain a higher expected utility by acting in this way. Otherwise it prefers to stay privately informed.
Given this assumption, the best response of country i to s j = C will be to allow for certification ( s i = C) if, given the economic environment Ω, there exist mechanisms with transfers t i (θ 1 , θ 2 ), such that (13) > (14) for all t i (θ 1 , θ 2 ). If such transfers t i (θ 1 , θ 2 ) do not exist, country i prefers to stay privately informed ( s i = N C).
The equilibrium in stage 1
It is now possible to characterize the equilibrium of the game in stage 1. Given the best responses detailed above, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 3 For economic environments satisfying
there is at least one country allowing the international agency to certify its type at the equilibrium of stage 1.
Moreover, both countries i will give their consent to certification at the equilibrium in stage 1 if there exist second-stage mechanisms with transfers t i (θ 1 , θ 2 )
(that implement the first-best under complete information) such that (13) > (14) for all t i (θ 1 , θ 2 ), i = 1, 2. In this case, for both i, the best response of country i is s i = C when country j's strategy is s j = C. If such transfers t i (θ 1 , θ 2 ) does not exist for both i, then there is one country that prefers to stay privately informed when the other country allows for certification.
Intuitively, it is easier to find such transfers t i (θ 1 , θ 2 ) when F (θ j ) is high (or equivalently whenθ j is high). For high values of F (θ j ), the probability that the certification of country j's type allows to reach the first-best is low, so that country i has a greater incentive to also give its consent in stage 1 in order to guarantee that the first-best is implemented in stage 2 (with complete information). For low values of F (θ j ), country i may have an incentive to free-ride on the other country's certification in order to stay privately informed and enjoy an information rent if the first-best is achieved in stage 2. This is shown formally in Lemma 4:
Lemma 4 The equilibrium in stage 1 is unique and is such that both countries allow for certification if and only if the economic environment satisfies:
or equivalently, if and only if:
For economic environments that do not satisfy (16), the equilibrium in stage 1 is unique and is such that one country allows for certification while the other country stays privately informed. The identity of the country allowing for certification will depend on the transfers used to implement the first-best agreement in stage 2, i.e.
Proof See Appendix C.
The threshold L 2 achieves its minimum at the point b 1 = b 2 = 0.5 (i.e. when countries are symmetric). The intuition behind this result is the same as for the threshold L 0 : the more symmetric countries are, the lower the efficiency gains are.
It is easier to give incentives to countries to undergo certification (i.e. to design transfers such that they both allow for certification) if these countries are more asymmetric (in terms of marginal benefits) or equivalently if expected collective gains from cooperation are higher.
Remark 2 Assume, for instance, that b i < b j . Then,θ i <θ for all ranges of the distribution of types, whileθ j may be such thatθ j ≥θ(i.e. F (θ j ) = 1). This is the case for economic environments satisfying:
where L 3 is obtained by substitutingθ toθ 2 in equation (12) . Therefore, for ranges above L 3 , F (θ j ) = 1 and condition (16) is automatically satisfied.
When (1−F (θ j )) = 0, the best response of country i is always to accept certification in stage 1 for all t i (θ 1 , θ 2 ) and all t i (θ 1 , θ 2 ) because country j is never sufficiently efficient for its certification to allow countries to reach the first-best agreement.
Country i will thus never have an incentive to free-ride on certification of country j's type.
Solution of the two-stage game
Three cases must be distinguished:
In these economic environments,θ i = θ, so that the equilibrium outcome of this game is the first-best agreement for all realizations of types, as soon as one country allows for certification, which will always happen along the equilibrium path by lemma 3.
There is only one country allowing for certification in stage 1. Sinceθ i > θ, certification by only one country is not always sufficient to reach the first-best agreement in the second stage. The country that certifies its type must be sufficiently efficient in terms of abatement. As a result, depending on the type of the country undergoing certification, the equilibrium in stage 2 may be either the first-best agreement y F B or the non-cooperative outcome y N .
Case 3: Economic environments satisfying
For these economic environments, both countries allow for certification at the equilibrium of stage 1. The equilibrium outcome in stage 2 is thus the first-best agreement y F B , for all realizations of types.
Consolidating cases 1-3
We can now state a proposition about the possibility to implement the firstbest abatement levels for all realizations of types in this two-stage game (similarly to Proposition 2):
Proposition 4 Given an economic environment Ω, the first-best agreement y 
For economic environments satisfying
, there exist some realizations of types for which the first-best is not implementable. 
Conclusion
This paper takes a mechanism design approach to study the effect of asymmetric information about abatement costs on the feasibility of an efficient environmental agreement when participation is voluntary. Due to the tension between incentive compatibility and participation, a first-best agreement cannot always be reached. First, assume that the mechanism implementing the agreement y = (a 1 , a 2 , t 1 , t 2 ) is Bayesian incentive compatible. From equation (3), we get that
This is the necessary and sufficient condition for budget-balance and Bayesian incentive compatibility
Substituting for a
and a
F B
2 , in the previous equation, we get the necessary and sufficient condition for budget-balance, Bayesian incentive compatibility and first-best agreement:
Step 2: The next step consists in adding the interim individual rationality constraints.
Note that for a mechanism that implements truthfully the first-best abatement level a
F B i
the type θ is the critical type since, at this first-best and with incentive compatibility (see Lemma 1),
Hence, a necessary and sufficient condition for the participation constraint (23) to hold everywhere is that it holds at θ, the lowest type. Summing the two individual rationality constraints (23) at the lowest type yields:
Combining (22) and (24), we get the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an ex-post efficient (first-best agreement) mechanism that is individually rational, Bayesian incentive compatible and budget-balanced:
This amounts to check:
Which is equivalent to condition (11) in Proposition 2 because b 1 + b 2 = 1.
Appendix B: One country allows for certification (Proof of lemma 2 and Proposition 3)
Assume that country 1's type θ 1 is publicly known and only country 2 has private information about its type θ 2 . A direct revelation mechanism has the following outcome function:
where θ 1 is the publicly known type of country 1 (i.e. country 1 cannot lie about its type) andθ 2 is the reported type of country 2. The first-best agreement y F B will 13 Optimal contracting under type-dependent reservation utilities has been extensively analyzed in the literature in the case of a single agent (Lewis and Sappington, 1989 and Jullien, 2000) and in the case of multiple agents (Carrillo, 1998) . Here, due to the convexity of the outside option and the fact that the distribution of types is uniform, we are in a simple case in which the critical type is at the bottom of the distribution.
be implementable in stage 2 if and only if there exists a direct revelation mechanism y(θ 1 , .) such that (i) the ex-post incentive compatibility and ex-post individual rationality constraints of country 2 are satisfied:
and (ii) the interim individual rationality constraint of country 1 is satisfied:
The rest of the proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2. The first step of the analysis consists in consolidating the budget-balance constraint and the ex-post incentive compatibility constraint for country 2.
Using a similar proof as for Lemma 1, it is easy to show that the direct revelation mechanism y(θ 1 , .) is incentive compatible for country 2 if and only iḟ
Integrating this equation yields:
Remember that the utility function is given by:
The ex-ante budget-balance constraint requires that E θ 2 [t 1 (θ 1 , θ 2 )+t 2 (θ 1 , θ 2 )] = 0. Consolidating the budget-balance constraint and equations (26) and (27) , and replacing a 1 and a 2 by their first-best levels a yield:
This is the necessary and sufficient condition of existence of a first-best agreement that is budget-balanced and ex-post incentive compatible for country 2.
The next step consists in adding the individual rationality (or participation)
constraints. We look at the ex-post participation constraint of country 2 and at the interim participation constraint of country 1 for a fixed type θ 1 . The interim participation constraint of country 1 is given by :
Using the same type of argument as in Proposition 2, we can show that θ is the critical type for the ex-post participation constraint of country 2. Hence, a necessary and sufficient condition for the participation constraint of country 2 to hold everywhere is that it holds at θ. Therefore, the ex post participation constraint of country 2 is given by:
At the first-best abatement levels, summing up both participation constraints yields:
Combining (28) and (30), we get the necessary and sufficient condition for incentive compatibility of country 2, individual rationality and budget-balance at the first-best abatement levels:
which is exactly the condition in Lemma 2.
We get thatθ 1 = θ if the economic environment satisfies:
And we denote this threshold
The proof for the situation in which country 2's type is public knowledge and country 1's type is private information is totally symmetric.
Appendix C: Proof of lemma 4
Before turning to the proof, I define the mechanisms used depending on the actions taken in stage 1. The set of strategies for each country i is S = {C, N C}. Denote by (s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ S × S the actions taken in stage 1.
• If (s 1 , s 2 ) = (C, C) (complete information in stage 2), y(., .) is the mechanism chosen to implement the first-best abatement levels in stage 2 (satisfying budget balance and individual rationality);
• If (s 1 , s 2 ) = (C, N C) (one-sided asymmetric information), y (., .) is the mechanism chosen to implement the first-best abatement levels in stage 2 when country 1 allows for certification (satisfying incentive compatibility for country 2, individual rationality and budget balance);
• If (s 1 , s 2 ) = (N C, C) (one-sided asymmetric information), y (., .) is the mechanism chosen to implement the first-best abatement levels in stage 2 when country 2 allows for certification (satisfying incentive compatibility for country 1, individual rationality and budget balance);.
Remember that in stage 1, countries do not know their own type. From the best responses derived in the paper, it is clear that at least one country allows for certification at the equilibrium of stage 1. I want to delineate the conditions under which both countries have simultaneously an incentive to allow for certification in stage 1. I thus need to show that it is possible to design a mechanism y(θ 1 ), θ 2 ) such that at the first-best abatement levels:
• When the strategy of country 1 is s 1 = C, the expected utility of country 2 is such that:
∀y (θ 1 , θ 2 ) satisfying incentive compatibility for country 2, individual rationality and budget balance.
• When the strategy of country 2 is s 2 = C, the expected utility of country 1 is such that:
∀y (θ 1 , θ 2 ) satisfying incentive compatibility for country 1, individual rationality and budget balance.
• The budget-balance constraint t 1 (θ 1 , θ 2 ) + t 2 (θ 1 , θ 2 ) = 0 is satisfied.
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Step 1: Rewriting the ex-ante budget-balance constraint
The ex-ante budget-balance requires that:
E θ 1 θ 2 [t 1 (θ 1 , θ 2 ) + t 2 (θ 1 , θ 2 )] = 0 14 We can use (as in previous proofs) the ex-ante budget-balance constraint (see Börgers and Norman, 2009 
